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THINLY VEILED: INSTITUTIONAL
MESSAGES IN THE LANGUAGE OF
SECULARISM IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN
FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES
R. Vance Eaton
If it were only that people have diversities of
taste, that is reason enough for not attempting to
shape them all after one model. But different persons
also require different conditions for their spiritual
development; and can no more exist healthily in the
same moral, than all the variety of plants can in the
same physical, atmosphere and climate.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and France, despite sharing a core of legal and
jurisprudential commonalities germane to most liberal democracies,
diverge in treatment of religious expression. Both the United States
and France have secular governments. Both ostensibly allow free
exercise of religious practices. However, secularism in France does not
mirror secularism in the United States. Commentators have termed
French secularism "confrontational, 2 "assertive," 3 and even a "civic
religion"4 in and of itself. As a sweeping, comparative generalization,
American secularism does not make neutrality demands of individuals
but seeks to accommodate religious expression.
One of France's most salient manifestations of its
"confrontational" secularism came in the form of a 2004 law banning
public-school students from wearing "any conspicuous sign of religious
1 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 81-82 (Oxford Univ. Press 1978)
(1859).
2 Dominque Custos, Secularism in French Public Schools: Back to War?
The French Statute of March 15, 2004, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 337, 337 (2006).
3 Ahmet T. Kuru, Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical
Conditions, Ideological Struggles, and State Policies toward Religion, 59
WORLD POLITICs 568 (2007).
4 BRONWYN WINTER, HiJAB & THE REPUBLIC: UNCOVERING THE FRENCH
HEADSCARF DEBATE 76 (Syracuse Univ. Press 2008).
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affiliation., 5 Observers understood France's 2004 law as targeting the
Muslim veil, a lightning rod topic within the study of Muslim
integration into the West. The United States, as compared to France,
has not experienced significant angst over the veil debate. The United
States has its own conflicts with Muslim integration, of course. The
issue of the veil in public schools brings to light parameters of
secularism in France and the United States and reveals interesting
differences between French and American institutional approaches to
religion and the individual.
This paper seeks to compare French and American legal
treatment of the Muslim headscarf in public school. First, I describe
France as trying to instill, or protect, preexisting, monolithic national
values. Next, I discuss the "American" approach to the veil in school,
considering actual headscarf disputes and analogous cases. Finally, I
consider the veiling in school debate in light of Muslim integration into
Europe and America. I ultimately favor American constitutional
guarantees as the best tools for approaching the veil debate. This
allows for focus not on the protection of homogenous, monolithic
values but rather on the potential to make public schools the locus of
broad religious expression and cultural integration.
The Muslim veil, 6 an article of clothing riddled with
misunderstanding in the West, 7 draws relentless fire in debates over the
5 CODE DE L'EDUCATION [C. EDUC.] art. L141-5-1 (3rd ed. Petits Codes
Dalloz 2010) (Fr.).
6 Muslim women wear a wide variety of garments covering their heads
and faces to varying degrees. The most common ones include the hiab--or
headscarf-leaving the face exposed; the niqab, covering most of the face and
leaving only the eyes exposed; the jilbab, a headscarf connected to a more
complete body garment; the chador, a full black body garment worn primarily
in Iran; and of course, the burqa, covering the body and the face in its entirety.
Throughout this paper I will use veil, headscarf, and hyab interchangeably, but
I acknowledge the inability of any one of these terms to apply to every form of
conservative Muslim female dress.
7 See, e.g., FADWA EL GUtNDI, VEIL: MODESTY, PRIVACY, AND RESISTANCE
(Berg 1999). Unfortunately, Western perceptions of the veil suffer from deep-
seated, long-standing misunderstandings. Recognizing Western
misunderstandings of the veil leads to acknowledgment of the necessity of
constraint in reacting, personally or institutionally, to the veil. For example,
there are numerous variations of the veil, a complexity reflected in the
numerous Afro-Asiatic and Indo-Iranian words for it, but "referred to by the
single convenient Western term 'veil,' which is indiscriminate, monolithic, and
ambiguous." One of the more ubiquitous terms, the Arabic hijab, takes on a
more figurative sense in Qu'ranic verse, "separating deity from mortals,
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compatibility of Islam with Western society. Some Western feminists
characterize the veil as a sign of female subordination, such that
Muslim men establish property rights in women to the exclusion of
other men by hiding the physical attributes of women from the sight of
other men. s Other Western feminists emphasize the liberty prerogative
wrongdoers from the righteous, believers from unbelievers, light from
darkness, and day from night." EL GUINDI at 154 (citations omitted). "Veil"
and "headscarf' belie the subtlety of meaning surrounding the various foreign
language terms to which they correspond.
Nor do notions of privacy in Western thought match with an identical
concept in Arabo-Islamic culture. The Western notion of privacy implicates
secretive personal space, while the Arabo-Islamic notion of privacy pertains to
the female sphere and the familial sphere. Id. at 82. One could argue with El
Guindi about the extent to which Western notions of privacy implicate
"secretive personal space." Nevertheless, Muslims and Westerners view
privacy from different perspectives, which is relevant because Westerners and
Muslims start the analysis of the veil from different perspectives. Id. at 77. El
Guindi does make the interesting comparison that in both Eastern and Western
culture, privacy comes with privilege. Id.
Islamic understanding of "sacred space" provides yet another hurdle
to Western understanding of the veil. Id. at 78. El Guindi describes how the
practice of prayer throughout the day illustrates the ability of the Muslim mind
to perceive seamless continuity between "normal" space and "sacred" space.
Id. When a Muslim prays during the day, he transforms any given space,
public or private into "sacred" space. Id. Likewise, the sanctity of female
modesty moving within otherwise "normal" public spaces poses no problem to
the Muslim mind. The same concept might jar the Westerner unaccustomed to
the Muslim continuity of sacred and normal.
8 See, e.g., John Bomeman, Veiling and Women's Intelligibility, 30
CARDozo L. REv. 2745, 2756 (2009). Subscribing to the domination model,
this anthropologist writes that men are "both incited in their own desire to have
sex with any generalized other, yet wanting to control or limit the desire of
others, specifically as their sisters and daughters become its object." Id. The
author refers to "men" anthropologically, but his descriptions might align with
an extreme modem manifestation of Islamic society such as the Taliban regime.
He concludes that liberal democracy requires an individual to show her face to
be intelligible, that "[v]eiling practices no longer operate within traditional,
kinship-based worlds, but in a modem political environment shaped by the
pressures of democratic public life." Id. He cites airport security and driver's
licenses as examples of democracy's requirement of exposure of the face. Id.
His examples arguably turn on modernity more than democracy. Borneman
says that "[v]eiling, which blocks recognition to a lesser or greater degree,
would seem to be in tension with democratic transparency. ... [V]isuality has
become central to the intelligibility of women--despite the wish of many
women to be seen for qualities that are spiritual, non-visible, or just inside their
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of the Muslim woman to remove herself from male objectification. 9
While the feminist perspective on the veil brings up fascinating
questions, this paper will largely avoid them and instead focus on
individual religious liberty and social integration.
II. THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE
France's 2004 law required the relinquishment of Muslim
headscarves, Sikh and Jewish headwear, and large crosses in public
schools. 10 Despite the mention of other religious symbols, onlookers
understood the law as primarily targeted at the Muslim veil." As the
background of the law reveals, France does not see the veil as
compatible with Frenchness. In an interview, Fadela Amara, France's
Secretary of State for Urban Policies, describes the burqa as a
"gangrene, the cancer of radical Islam which completely distorts the
message of Islam.' 12  She goes on to say that "Those who have
struggled for women's rights back home in their own countries - I'm
thinking particularly of Algeria - we know what it represents and what
the obscurantist political project is that lies behind it, to confiscate the
most fundamental liberties."'
' 3
Amara's no-holds-barred approach gives pause, if for nothing
else, because she grew up in Algeria. Indeed, the number of references
in the French National Assembly during the 2004 veil debate to Amara
came in second only to Jean Jaures, giant of French socialism. 14 Amara
is not alone in her views among North Africans in France. Bronwyn
Winter, in her book HIJAB & THE REPUBLIC, points out that after
passage of the 2004 law, one poll showed that as many as forty-two
percent of French Muslims supported the law. 15 Other data tends to
show that as little as two percent of Muslim women in France even veil
to begin with. 16
heads." Id. The author seems to have made a tenuous connection between
government processes and physical covering of the face.
9 1d. at 2756.
10 WINTER, supra note 4, at 222.
" JOHN R. BOWEN, WHY THE FRENCH DON'T LIKE HEADSCARVES 1 (2007).
12 Ben Hall, French Minister Calls for Ban on Burka, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Aug. 14, 2009, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9f37d5aO-88f9-1 lde-
b50f-00l44feabdc0.html.
13 id.
14 BowEN, supra note 11, at 137.
15 WINTER, supra note 4, at 224.
16 Id. at 225.
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These perplexing statistics reveal the depth of complexity of
Muslim-state relations in France. The 2004 law followed decades of
national angst over Muslim immigration. Immigration itself followed
decades of colonialism, which in tum followed centuries of dynamic,
often violent relations with the Arabo-Islamic world. 7 Just as France
has grappled with Muslim integration, it forged its own secular identity
over centuries of tumult.
Winter describes French secularism as containing three major
contradictions. 8 The most pertinent of these for comparative purposes
is "secularism as heir of religion.''9 Winter thus describes secularism
as adopting the characteristics of a religion. In that sense, "[n]ation has
replaced Church, the Declaration of the Rights of Man has replaced the
Bible, the law has replaced the gospel, and secularism is the key
element of the Republican catechism., 20  She goes on to say that
secularism is a "civil religion" and that secularism itself becomes "the
faith of each citizen that makes that citizen a willing participant in the
collective project.",21 Next, I consider some factors coming to bear on
the adoption of secularism as a religion itself.
III. BACKGROUND OF FRENCH SECULARISM
A quick sketch of the development of secularism, or laYcit, in
France will set the stage for France's collision with the Muslim veil.
The French Constitutions of 1946 and 1958 explicitly refer to laycitd:
"France is an indivisible, secular (laique), democratic and social
Republic. 22 The Constitution does not define la~cit, a term lacking an
exact English translation because of the layers of political and social
17 Winter points out that it would be "serious... error to ignore the
historical shadow of precolonial or extracolonial interactions between France
and the Arabo-Muslim world within the current debates.... France and the
Middle Eastern and (in particular) Maghrebian Muslim worlds thus have a
love-hate relationship that is almost 1,300 years old." WINTER, supra note 4, at
97-99.
18 WINTER, supra note 4, at 69-76. The contradictions, largely self-
explanatory, are "the obligation to be free," "secularism as a 'Republican
catechism,"' and "secularism as heir of religion."
'9 Id. at 73.20 Id. at 74.
21 Id. at 76.
22 BoWEN, supra note 11, at 29. The Constitutions reflect the Fourth and
Fifth Republics, respectively.
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meaning embedded in it. One author says the term "remains one of
those 'essentially contested concepts' that is politically useful precisely
because it has no agreed-on definition." 23 Harry Judge, in The Muslim
Headscarf and French Schools, describes la'cit as "implying a
rejection of any influence by organized religions upon public education
(or indeed on other areas of social life). 24 For purposes of this paper, I
assume that Judge interprets laicitg accurately in the context of public
schooling. Larcit in France arises out of centuries of political
struggles, the details of which fall beyond the scope of this paper and
the complexities of which evade broad generalities. An attempt at
summation follows.
France and the Roman Catholic Church swung in and out of
relationships of varying degrees of estrangement throughout the 18th
century. In his book Why the French Don't Like Headscarves, John
Bowen describes the developments in post-Revolution France as
following the path of a pendulum.25 The Revolution itself marked the
beginning of the rise of "the people" and the inception of secularism as
a Republican concept. 26  Immediately following the Revolution,
Robespierre orchestrated violent persecutions of suspected monarchists
and targeted believers of all faiths.27 Over the next century or so, both
French Protestants 28 and educated elites played a role in combating the
monarchy-church duo during these power swings.29  It appears,
therefore, that a confluence of forces helped make larcit a founding
principle of the Republic. Under one theory, "[tlhe Revolution laid
down the basic principles, the Third Republic extracted the church from
the schools; the Assembly ratified laYcitg in 1905. "3o
231 Id. at 2.
24 Harry Judge, The Muslim Headscarf and French Schools, 111 AM. J.
EDUC. 1, 19 (2004).
25 BOWEN, supra note 11, at 22.
26 WINTER, supra note 4, at 63-64.
27 BowEN, supra note 11, at 22.
28 WINTER, supra note 4, at 62. Winter appropriately points out the
"protest" that was "Protestantism;" this would encompass protest against
church-monarchy power. The Reformation came much earlier than the Third
Republic, but it is fair of Winter to include the influence of Huguenots among
the forces working against the church.
29 Id.
30 BowEN, supra note 11, at 28 (citing JEAN BAUBEROT, HISTOIRE DE LA
LAICITE FRANCAISE (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (2000)))
(identifying the "three thresholds of larcite').
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The church made gains with passage of the Falloux law of 1850,
which remains in effect despite the changes of 1905.31 The Falloux law
made private Catholic school an established method of providing
education to the public and allowed the state to pay for up to ten
percent of Catholic school expenses.32 Notwithstanding other advances
made against the entanglement of church and state in France, Catholic
priests remained on the state payrolls until 1905. 33 France underwent
the purification rite of secularization in 1905 by codifying the
philosophy of larcite.34 The law said, among other things, that "the
Republic assures freedom of conscience. It guarantees the free exercise
of faiths under no other restrictions than those set out hereinafter in the
interests of public order., 35 Article 2 of the 1905 law states: "[T]he
Republic does not recognize, remunerate or subsidize any faith. 36
Article 28 makes illegal the public display by the state of religious
symbols, with certain exceptions.37
The 1905 law focused largely on extricating the Catholic
Church's property and finances from the state. Curiously, the French
government retained ownership of cathedrals and gave ownership of
other church property to municipal governments. 38 It allowed the
Catholic Church, previously recognized under Napoleon, to reorganize
as a private entity with tax-exempt status, giving it the right to use the
properties for free. 39 This part of the law only applied to existing
churches, so mosques created later in the century did not become
subject to public ownership. 40  Formerly Catholic Church-owned
property continues to benefit from government subsidy today.41
31 WINTER, supra note 4, at 66.
32 id.
33 Judge, supra note 24, at 4-5.
34 Id. at 5.
35 WINTER, supra note 4, at 54.
36 id.
37 Id. Winter lists the exceptions as "religious buildings, cemeteries,
funereal monuments, and museums or exhibitions."
38 BOWEN, supra note 11, at 27; WINTER, supra note 4, at 54-55.
39 BowEN, supra note 11, at 27; WINTER, supra note 4, at 54-55.
40 BowEN, supra note 11, at 27.
41 Id. at 27-28. Although the property must have existed in 1905, the
public ownership provides a substantial benefit to the Catholic Church in
France.
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IV. TUMULT CONTINUES INTO THE 20" CENTURY AND BEYOND
After the Algerian War ended, the influx of North African
Muslims to France began.a2  Charles de Gaulle attempted to
reinvigorate the "real" France in 1958, in part by pumping money back
into Catholic schools.43 According to Judge, de Gaulle did this in part
to improve the situation of education across the board.4" Parochial
schools continue to enjoy access to public funding today. In 1959 the
Debr6 law allowed Catholic schools to continue offering religious
instruction as long as students had the option to decline the religious
portions of the curriculum. 45 The Catholic schools had to agree to
accept students of any or no belief in order to retain access to public
funds4 6
The next crucial step in setting the stage for the 2004 law came
in the form of the opinion of the Council of State of 1989, following
the first prominent conflict over the hijab.47 The equivalent of a junior
high school principal sent three girls home for wearing headscarves.
Education minister Lionel Jospin sought the opinion from the Council
of State as a way out of the polarized political setting resulting from the
conflict. The opinion's language set the groundwork for France's
current approach to religious symbols in school as follows:
In schools, the wearing by students of signs by which
they intend to manifest their religious affiliation is
not by itself incompatible with the principle of
secularism, insofar as it constitutes the exercise of
freedom of expression and freedom of manifestation
of religious beliefs, but ... this freedom would not
allow students to sport signs of religious affiliation
that, due to their nature, the conditions in which they
are worn individually or collectively, or their
ostentatious character or display as a protest, would
constitute an act of pressure, provocation,
proselytism or propaganda, or would jeopardize the
dignity or freedom of the student or of other members
42 Judge, supra note 24, at 6.
43 Id.
44Id.
45 BowEN, supra note 11, at 27.
46 Judge, supra note 24, at 6; WINTER, supra note 4, at 66.
47 WINTER, supra note 4, at 135-38. The Council of State is France's
highest administrative court, and the opinions are binding on all courts.
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of the school community, would compromise their
health or safety, or would perturb the conduct of
teaching activities or the educational role of the
teachers, or would disturb order in the establishment
or the normal operation of public service.48
Winter points out that ostentatoire does not have an identical
meaning to its closest English translation "ostentatious," but rather has
a more subdued meaning akin to "highly conspicuous. '  This
distinction matters because the headscarf cases in the following fifteen
years would turn on the degree to which headscarves were
ostentatoire.
50
Following the 1989 opinion, the Council of State confirmed that
schools could not make general bans on religious articles in a 1990
case, striking down a junior high school's decision to ban "all
distinctive signs, worn as clothing or otherwise, of a religious, political
or philosophical nature." 5' Administrative tribunals would use the
Council of State opinion to decide headscarf cases until 2004.
Estimates vary as to how many headscarf expulsions occurred between
1983 and 2004, but it appears they number less than 100.52
Attention to the headscarf issue fluctuated during the '90s, but
did not reach critical mass until 2003.53 Winter partly attributes
increasingly tense relations between Maghrebian Muslims and the
French leading up to passage of the law to the terrorist attacks of
9/11. 54 Judeo-Muslim relations also grew tense, exacerbated by the
2002 siege of Ramallah.55 Political attention to the plight of girls in
poor immigrant banlieues56 grew following the high profile murder of a
Muslim girl in a Parisian banlieue and the publication of a book
exposing the prevalence of gang rapes on poor Muslim girls.57 These
48 CE, Nov. 27, 1989, Avis no. 246.893, 27, quoted in WINTER, supra note
4, at 138.
49 WINTER, supra note 4, at 138.
50 Id. at 139.
51 Id. at 167, 169-70. The Council similarly struck down another school's
blanket prohibition of head coverings in 1992.
52Id. at 164-65.53 Id. at 206-07, 2 11-1 2 .
54 Id. at 206.
55 WINTER, supra note 4, at 207.
56 Banlieue literally means suburbs, but in reality, they are more like
projects.
57 WINTER, supra note 4, at 207-09.
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incidents resulted in public attention and large-scale protests by Muslim
girls in 2003.58 In 2002, teachers of a large school in Lyon went on
strike after the school refused to prevent a Muslim girl from wearing
the headscarf.59 The teachers viewed the removal of the headscarf as
necessary to maintain "fragile" order within the school, based on what
they perceived as the tendency for French Muslim youth to adopt a
"combative identity .... according to [one writer], 'built in great part
around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."' 60
As the centenary of the 1905 law approached, political
opposition towards the hijab grew. 61 Prominent officials and
politicians in France, including those who had previously expressed
more accepting views, started making anti-hijab comments.62 President
Jacques Chirac eventually initiated the Stasi Commission to investigate
the plight of Muslims in France. 63  Winter points out that the
Commission consisted mainly of "political and intellectual elite"
although it did include proportional Muslim representation (but not
proportional female representation). 64 The Commission heard from
dozens of interested groups and academics and received some 2,000
letters expressing views on the hijab.5
The Commission's final report included recommendations
designed to help Muslim integration in France. 66 Among other things,
the Commission recommended the creation of the National Institute of
Islamic Studies as well as an Anti-Discrimination Authority to
prosecute discrimination cases in court. 67 It also suggested adding the
Muslim holiday Eid-el-Kebir and the Jewish holiday Yom Kippur to
58 Id. Fadela Amara, quoted supra note 13 as describing the burqa as a
"cancer of radical Islam," was president of the group organizing the protests, Ni
Putes ni Soumises. Id. at 209.
"9Id. at 211.
60 Id. at 213, (quoting CHAHDORTr DJAVANN, Que pense Allah de
l'Europe?, 42 (Gallimard 2004)).
61 See id. at 213-15.
621Id. at 214.
63 WINTER, supra note 4, at 215.
64 Id. at 216-18. Winter states that three members were of "Muslim
background," Id. at 217, but Bowen says there was only one Muslim on the
Commission. BOWEN, supra note 11, at 114. To reconcile these two
statements, presumably two of the three mentioned by Winter did not actively
practice Islam.
65 WINTER, supra note 4, at 221.
66 Id. at 220.
67 Id.
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public calendars. 68 As to the veil, the Commission recommended doing
away with the ostentatoire standard from the 1989 opinion and using
instead the word "ostensible," which watered down the standard from
"highly conspicuous" to merely "conspicuous." 69 In so doing, the
Commission "shifted the focus from degree of provocative display to
degree of visibility., 70  According to Bowen, eighteen of twenty
commissioners voted in favor of the new language.7'
The National Assembly passed a bill adopting the Commission's
recommendation as to conspicuous religious symbols 72 but left out
many of the other "positive" suggestions in the report, like the addition
of the Muslim and Jewish holidays to the state calendar.73 Bowen, who
attended the hearings, reports that the National Assembly seemed to
have made up its mind before starting the hearings that it would make a
law banning religious symbols; nonetheless, the Assembly discussed
the law for almost twenty-four hours, longer than usual. 74 Bowen's
commentary, describing and quoting the government's opening
argument during the hearing, gives a lucid picture of the considerations
before the National Assembly:
Prime Minister Raffirin opened the session
with the government's case. He framed the issue as
follows: "The question is our capacity to preserve our
values and to transmit them to immigrants," he said.
He explained that these values included freedom of
conscience, equality between men and women, the
"humanistic value" of fraternity, and lacit6, "which
we built in dialogue with the Church." (Some
Socialists later said, "It was war, not dialogue.") The
new law will "respond to those who would place their
communalist affiliation above the Republic's laws."
The veil and other religious signs "take on ipso facto
a political meaning and can no longer be considered
as personal signs of religious affiliation." The law is
68 Id.
691d. at 138, 222.
701 Id. at 222.
71 BOwEN, supra note 11, at 113.
72 As Bowen translates it, the law states, "In public primary and secondary
schools, wearing signs or clothes by which pupils clearly display a religious
affiliation is prohibited." Id. at 136.
73 WINTER, supra note 4, at 224.
74 BOWEN, supra note 11, at 135.
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needed to support school principals and teachers,
who have, since the nineteenth century, "integrated
immigrants with the children of France."
75
The government's opening statement leaves little to the
imagination as to whether the 2004 law implicated deeper notions of
integration and xenophobia.
Commission members later made comments about the National
Assembly's narrow focus on the hijab issue, but Bowen points out that
the other more positive recommendations had arisen in previous
commissions.76 In that sense, the only new recommendation from the
commission that actually passed was replacing the ostentatoire
language.
French schools have responsibility for enforcing the 2004 law.77
Presumably, any issue of interpretation of the 2004 law would go
through the same administrative tribunals, as did the prior headscarf
disputes, leaving the Council of State and ultimately the European
Court of Human Rights with the right of review. 78 Muslim groups
initially spoke out against the law, encouraging girls to wear
headscarves. 79  They intended to argue that the headscarf was a
"discreet" religious symbol, making it impliedly permitted under the
law. 80 However, that plan was abandoned after a hostage situation
involving French journalists in Iraq made dissent politically difficult.
81
The plight of Muslim leaders in the headscarf debate contrasts
with the efforts of French politicians, who try to "be secularist in the
face of Islam" yet "Catholic in the face of Rome., 82 Winter cites
examples from the last several years of political or diplomatic
recognition of the Catholic Church or the Pope, as compared with the
more aggressive secularism measures towards Islam, such as the ban of
" Id. at 136.
76 Id. at 123.
77 BOwEN, supra note 11, at 144; WINTER, supra note 4, at 139.
78 BowEN, supra note 11, at 138; WINTER supra note 4, at 137.
79 BowEN, supra note 11, at 144.
80 Id.
81 BowEN, supra note 11, at 14546; Judge, supra note 24, at 22. The
hostage takers in Iraq said they wanted the 2004 law repealed (in exchange for
the lives of the hostages), so Muslim leaders in France risked giving the
appearance of aligning with the terrorists if they supported resistance to the
new law. Id.
82 WINTER, supra note 4, at 80.
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the hjiab.83 Judge also points out disparity in treatment, noting that
"[n]o Muslim school in metropolitan France, and only one in its
overseas territories, has yet received comparable financial or legal
treatment" to that of Catholic schools.84 Judge and Winter, in pointing
out these disparities, speak to the "monolithic" character of French
secularism, which Winter refers to as "catho-laicit6" or "christiano-
laicit6.85
However, both fundamental French Catholics and Muslim
leaders have similar desires in the face of aggressive secularism: both
want "greater 'flexibility' within the secular school system," and both
seem to show "support for Islamic schools," which, in theory, should
deserve the same treatment under the law as Catholic schools.8 6 The
schoolgirls in the 1989 headscarf dispute received widespread but not
complete support in France from Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish
leaders alike.87 Some leaders expressed lukewarm support; one bishop
commented in 1996 that the hyab signifies "'submission' to Catholics
but is "'perhaps for those who wear it, a sign of identification and even
emancipation."'
88
France's law appears facially neutral, but ultimately, "everyone
understood the law to be aimed at keeping Muslim girls from wearing
headscarves in school. 89 Susana Mancini, in The Power of Symbols
83 Id. at 76-80. Among other things, she mentions the refusal of some
regional leaders to remove crosses from school classrooms, the lowering of
French flags to half-mast at the death of Pope Jean-Paul II, and an attempt by
the Socialist Party to rename Notre Dame plaza "Place Jean Paul II." Id. at 77-
79.
84 Judge, supra note 24, at 7. French Muslims have made several attempts
at forming a political group to represent Muslim interests in France. WINTER,
supra note 4, at 84. The Conseil Francais du Culte Musulman (CFCM) and its
predecessor councils have made limited headway at achieving institutional
acceptance of Islam in France. Id. at 85. Interestingly, secularist Muslims have
attacked the CFCM because it gives allegedly fundamental Muslims the status
of the only group "that has been obliged to have religious representation." Id.
at 87 (quoting Samia Labidi, Demain au Bourget: Pour une identit lafque de
la communautj arabo-musulmane, Prochoix, Winter 2004, at 13.).
85 Id. at 80 (citing JEAN BAUBEROT, Histoire de la la'fcit6 en France
(Presses Universitaires de France 2004); La'fcit6 et religion dans I'Union
Europ6enne, http://jeanbauberotlaicite.blogspirit.com/europe et-laicite/).
Id. at84.87Id. at 140-41.
88 Id. at 198 (citing LE MONDE, Dec. 16, 2006).
89 BOWEN, supra note 11, at 1.
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and Symbols as Power, summed up the essence of France's message to
Islam, notwithstanding the overt rejection of all things religious in
public life, as conveying a "dichotomous construction of the
relationship between Christianity and Islam, according to which the
former-to be sure in a secularized form-is projected as a central
component of Western civilization, while the latter is cast as a
threatening 'other."'
90
V. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY JURISPRUDENCE IN THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) interprets the
European Convention on Human Rights, of which France is a member.
In Dogru v. France9 1 and Kervanci v. France,92 the ECHR upheld the
expulsion of Muslim girls from public school for wearing the
headscarf, relying on the margin of appreciation doctrine93 and
accepting the "constitutional" doctrine of secularism in France. The
expulsions in both cases predated the 2004 law, but the opinions came
after the law and cited the law. Both cases also cited a previous ECHR
case, Sahin v. Turkey,94 which upheld Turkey's ban on the veil in
universities. In all three cases, the ECHR accepted the paternalistic
argument that state prohibition of the veil was necessary to protect
Muslim females from Muslim patriarchy and that the judgment as to
the necessity of such protection fell within the margin of appreciation.
95
The French cases involved physical education class, and Sahin
involved university students, so the ECHR has not ruled on the 2004
90 Susanna Mancini, The Power of Symbols and Symbols as Power:
Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural Convergence, 30 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2629, 2629 (2009).
91 Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1579,
available at http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1579.html.
92 Kervanci v. France, App. No. 31645/04, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R., no English
version available, summary available at
http://sim.law.uu.nl/S IM/CaseLaw/hof.nsf/233813e697620022c 125686400523
2b7/091340f7bb6af613c12575120053c15e?OpenDocument.
93 The margin of appreciation doctrine refers to the latitude the ECHR
grants states based on each state's appreciation of its own unique needs. See
Mancini, supra note 90, at 2657.
94 Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5 (2005),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl 97/view.asp?action=html&
documentld=789023&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69
A27FD8FB86142BF01 C 1I66DEA398649.
95 Mancini, supra note 90, at 2647-48.
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law's blanket ban of the veil for elementary-aged students. The
precedents do not bode well for any future challenges, even if a narrow
window of opportunity remains open.
Notwithstanding the prior ECHR headscarf cases, a recent
ECHR case indicates a possible shift in the court's religion
jurisprudence. The dispute started in Italy, a country that, according to
Mancini, focuses the rejection of the "other" (read: immigrants and
Islam, particularly) in establishing a national identity.96 In this case,
Solie Lausti, an atheist mother of two school-age boys, sued to stop
Italian schools from displaying the crucifix in public school.97 Italian
courts upheld the display of the crucifix in public schools, concluding
that only through Christian values could the state achieve secularism.
98
In other words, the Italian courts viewed the desirable values of
tolerance and non-interference as growing out of Christianity. To Italy,
banning the crucifix would have been inconsistent with secularism.
99
No doubt, countless parties in Establishment Clause cases in the United
States have attempted to draw our legal system into the broader cloth of
Judeo-Christian values. The argument succeeded to a degree in Van
Orden v. Perry: "[o]ur opinions, like our building, have recognized the
role the Decalogue plays in America's heritage." 100  However,
American Establishment Clause cases do not go so far as to describe
"but-for" causation like the Italian courts have done.
101
96 See generally, Mancini, supra note 90.
97 Lausti v. Italie, App. No. 30814/06, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, available in
French at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp 197/view.asp?action=html&
documented=857724&portal=hbkm&source extemalbydocnumber&tabl.
English summary available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?
action html&documentld=857732&portal=hbkm&source=extemalbydocnumb
er&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01Cl 166DEA398649.
98 Mancini, supra note 90, at 2633.
99 Id.
100 545 U.S. 677, 689 (2005).
101 As in, "but-for Christianity, we would not have tolerance and therefore,
secularism." Identifying a necessary causal connection between Christianity
and Western liberalism problematically ignores both the possibility of universal
religious values and examples of explicit intolerance in Christianity's founding
document. See Robert E. Hume et al, A Definition of Religion: A Symposium
(Concluded), 7 J. OF RELIGION 284, 295 ("Religion is the consciousness of the
highest social values."). See, e.g. Deuteronomy 22:20-1 ("If, however, the
charge is true and no proof of the girl's virginity can be found, she shall be
brought to the door of her father's house and there the men of her town shall
stone her to death. She has done a disgraceful thing in Israel by being
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In any event, the ECHR held in favor of Lausti.10 2  Lausti
claimed the display violated Article 2 of Protocol I of the European
Convention, 0 3 establishing her right to have her children educated in
conformity with her religious convictions. She also claimed that the
presence of the crucifixes violated her children's rights under Article
9,1°4 which establishes the right to freedom of religion. Agreeing with
both claims, the ECHR said that "respect for the convictions of parents
should be possible in the framework of an education capable of
assuring an open scholarly environment, favoring inclusion over
exclusion, regardless of the social origins of the students, their religious
beliefs, or their ethnic origins. ,105 As to Italy's claims that the crucifix
has acquired a non-religious meaning, the court found "the symbol of
the crucifix has a plurality of meanings, among which the religious
meaning predominates."' 0 6 The court also stated that the symbol could
have a negative influence on Lausti's children's right to free exercise:
The presence of the crucifix can easily be
interpreted by students of all ages as a religious sign,
and they will feel educated in a scholarly
promiscuous while still in her father's house. You must purge the evil from
among you.").
102 Lausti, supra note 97.
103 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Protocol 1, art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 ("No person shall
be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it
assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right
of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own
religions and philosophical convictions.") [hereinafter CPHRFFP].
104 Id. art. 9 ("1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or
morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.").
105 Lausti, supra note 97, at I I ("Le respect des convictions des parents
doit &tre possible dans le cadre d'une dducation capable d'assurer un
environnement scolaire ouvert et favorisant linclusion plut6t que l'exclusion,
inddpendamment de lorigine sociale des 6lves, des croyances religieuses ou
de l'origine ethnique.") (my translation).
,°Id. at 13 ("De l'avis de ]a Cour, le symbole du crucifix a une pluralit6
de significations parmi lesquelles la signification religieuse est pr~dominante")
(my translation).
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environment marked by a given religion. That which
can encourage religious students, might disturb
students of other religions, or those who do not
profess any religion. This risk is especially present
for students of minority religions. Negative liberty is
not limited to the absence of religious services or
religious instruction. It extends to practices and
symbols, specific or general that express a belief, a
religion, or atheism. This negative right merits
protection if it is the state that is expressing a belief
and if the person is placed in a situation in which he
cannot get out of or only willfully with
disproportionate sacrifice. 107
From an American perspective, the Lausti decision looks
interesting next to the French headscarf cases. In fact, it seems
incomprehensible that the presence of a crucifix violates a child's
freedom to exercise religion but a ban on the veil does not. The ECHR
exhibited hypersensitivity to free exercise in Lausti even though an
American court could have easily decided the case on Establishment
Clause grounds. Of course, an American jurisprudent might agree that
the establishment of religion created by the display of the cross also
implicates the free exercise right of students. Nevertheless, the major
difficulty comes with the irreconcilability of the crucifix and hijab
cases.
Ironically, the French Commissioner on Laws said during the
2004 hearings that France needed a legislatively enacted law because of
the ECHR's statements indicating that "only the legislator is authorized
107 Id. at 14 ("La presence du crucifix peut aisdment 8tre interprtWe par
des l&ves de tous Ages comme un signe religieux et ils e sentiront 6duqufs
dans un environnement scolaire marqu6 par une religion donne. Ce qui peut
Etre encourageant pour certains dlves religieux, peut &re perturbant
motionnellement pour des 61ves d'autres religions ou ceux qui ne professent
aucune religion. Ce risque est particulifrement pr6sent chez les l ves
appartenant A des minoritds religieuses. La libert6 nggative nest pas limitfe A
l'absence de services religieux ou d'enseignement religieux. Elle s'6tend aux
pratiques et aux symboles exprimant, en particulier ou en gfn~ral, une
croyance, une religion ou lathdisme. Ce droit nggatif mfrite une protection
particuli~re si c'est l'Etat qui exprime une croyance et si la personne est placfe
dans une situation dont elle ne peut se dfgager ou seulement en consentant des
efforts et un sacrifice disproportionnfs.") (my translation).
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to restrict the exercise of basic liberties,"'10 8 apparently alluding to the
margin of appreciation doctrine. Jean-Paul Costa, President of the
ECHR, testified during the 2004 hearings as to the need for legislation
to make sure the veil law fell within the ECHR's margin of
appreciation. 109
In curtailing "free exercise" in the headscarf cases, the ECHR
gives European states a margin of appreciation in establishing the
values by which the State can strike an appropriate balance, tailored to
national needs. In the "establishment" context, Lausti shows that the
court does not provide as wide a margin of appreciation. The free
exercise language in Lausti leaves an unclear picture as to whether that
case also narrows the margin for free exercise. Before Lausti, Mancini
identified animus towards Islam as the common denominator of the
ECHR's headscarfjurisprudence." 0 Now that the court has taken one
step against the monolith of Euro-Christian values, Mancini's argument
may shift. Whereas Christianity "lost" in a sense, one cannot really
argue that Islam "won." At the very least, anti-monolithism did not
"lose" in the pattern Mancini perceives in disputes in Europe. Lausti
seems to be a chink in the armor of the monolith.
VI. GROWING ANIMUS IN THE UNITED STATES
France may have a longer history than the United States with
Islam, but the United States has become increasingly aware of the
presence of Muslims within its borders and abroad. Muslim interaction
with the West gained attention from academics in the United States
long before 9/11 or the spiked growth of immigrant Muslim
populations in parts of the United States."' Popular animus rose with
108 BowEN, supra note 11, at 137.
'09Id. at 137-39.
110 Mancini, supra note 90, at 2661. Mancini points out that the ECHR
allows the French government to infringe upon the free exercise prerogatives of
individual Muslims in France; while in Turkey, it curtails majority rule based
on beliefs that are both Islamic and contrary to Western liberalism. In other
words, Mancini sees Islam as on the losing side regardless of other
determinative factors in the dispute.
11' For example, in 1993, Samuel Huntington infamously described Islam
as having "bloody borders" in his post-Cold War world view. See Samuel P.
Huntington, Clash of Civilizations?, 27:3 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 22 (1993) (later
developed and published as SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER, (Simon & Schuster 1993)). Eight years
later, Edward Said lamented the use of 9/11 as "proof' of Huntington's thesis
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the estrangement of relations between Islam and the West beginning in
the 1980s. 1 2  Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Islamophobia in
America has reached new heights.1 3  Sam Harris illustrates this
sentiment in his book, End of Faith, in a chapter titled The Problem
with Islam, in which he writes, "[w]e are at war with Islam .... It is
not merely that we are at war with an otherwise peaceful religion that
has been 'hijacked' by extremists. We are at war with precisely the
vision of life that is prescribed to all Muslims in the Koran .. 114 To
in Said's article, "The Clash of Ignorance." See Edward W. Said, The Clash of
Ignorance, THE NATION, Oct. 22, 2001.
112 See, e.g., FAEGHEH SHIRAzI, THE VEIL UNVEILED: THE HuAB IN
MODERN CULTURE 39-61 (Univ. Press of Fla. 2001). Shirazi uses an unlikely
source, cartoons in pornographic magazines, to track the evolution of popular
American opinion towards Islam and the veil generally before 9/11. She shows
how increasing hostility depicted in the cartoons of men's magazines paralleled
U.S. foreign policy towards Muslim states. In the early 1960s, cartoon
depictions of Muslim women focused on supposedly licentious and uninhibited
gender relations in Muslim societies. Id. at 50. These early cartoons show
Muslim men in "harem" scenarios, partly reflecting the American male's
tendency to "begrudge the sexual opportunities allotted to these men." Id. at 52.
Until the United States "started to conceive Islam, embodied by Ayatollah
Khomeini, more and more as a threat to American interests," the cartoons
maintained a comical slant, and depictions of the veil usually portrayed the veil
as an object of sexual curiosity and fetish. Id.
Following the Iranian hostage crisis of 1981, cartoons in pornographic
magazines adopted a more hostile, scathing position towards Islam. Id. at 54.
Shirazi reports that a 1986 edition of Hustler depicts a pregnant Muslim woman
wearing a shirt with the words "Future Suicide Bomber" and an arrow pointing
at her belly. Id. at 58. During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the cartoons in
Hustler frequently featured veiled women and made various negative
statements about Muslim women, perverse Muslim sexuality, and terrorism.
Id. at 58-59. She says that in these cartoons, the veil "is the badge of the
supporters of terrorism, and it functions as a weapon used against women, by
reducing them to body parts and by stifling their screams." Id. at 59. Shirazi
guesses that the "us against them" nature of the pornographic cartoons may
have even helped to "boost the resolve of American troops to rally against
Saddam Hussein." Id.
113 See Lorraine Sheridan, Islamophobia before and after September 11 h
2001, in CONFRONTING ISLAMOPHOBIA IN EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE 164 (Barry
Van Driel ed., 2004) (citing increases in physical violence, verbal abuse, hate
crimes, and Islamophobic material on the internet following 9/11 though
acknowledging the questionability of the numbers due to the inadequacy of
data before 9/11).
114 SAm HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE
OF REASON 109-10 (Norton 2004).
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be fair, Harris vigorously attacks faith of all flavors. Nevertheless, he
levels much of the invective in End of Faith at Islam. He quotes in
depth the violence described and mandated by its tenets.' 15 He queries,
"[w]here are the Palestinian Christian suicide bombers?... Where are
the throngs of Tibetans ready to perpetrate suicidal atrocities against
Chinese noncombatants?"' 16  Harris denies that violent Islamic
fundamentalism derives from political or economic forces but rather
blames the Qu'ran and hadith (the Qu'ran's guiding narrations).'
1 7
Harris's perspective on the relationship between America and
Islam reveals the extent and potential of American Islamophobia post
9/11.118 Dissimilarly, France developed animus against Muslims over
time and, of course, occupied Muslim territories well before the
exponential growth of Muslim immigration into France. Compared to
France's slowly-compounding internal strife, popular American animus
towards Islam escalated precipitously after 9/11.
VII. AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE AFFECTING THE HIJAB
IN SCHOOLS
Animus against a group can translate into a "closure strategy," in
which "dominant groups undertake social closure processes to
safeguard and ensure their position in the hierarchy."" 9 Such strategies
have materialized in American schools in the past, such as when "social
elites resisted school expansion for particular populations in the early
2 0th century in an effort to maintain existing structures of class, race,
l5 Id. at 117-23.
116 Id. at 233 (emphasis in original).
"7 Id. at 109-10. Harris' characterizations of Qu'ranic verse as inherently
violent and Biblical scripture as incapable of justifying violence are suspect.
See Psalms 45:3-5 ("Gird your sword upon your side, 0 mighty one ... Let
your sharp arrows pierce the hearts of the king's enemies; let the nations fall
beneath your feet."); Matthew 10:34 ("Do not suppose that I have come to
bring peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword."); Joel
3:9-11 ("Proclaim this among the nations: Prepare for war! Rouse the warriors!
Let all the fighting men draw near and attack. Beat your plowshares into
swords and your pruning hooks into spears. Let the weakling say 'I am
strong!' Come quickly all you nations from every side, and assemble there.
Bring down your warriors, 0 Lord!").
118 HARP S, supra note 114.
119 Sharon L. Sassler, School Participation among Immigrant Youths: The
Case of Segmented Assimilation in the Early 20th Century, 79 SOCIOLOGY OF
EDUCATION 1, 4 (2006) (citing Randall Collins, Functional and Conflict
Theories of Educational Stratification, 36 AM. Soc. REv. 1002 (1971)).
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and sex stratification."'1 20 American jurisprudential recalcitrance to
banning religious symbols shows sensitivity to the possibility of
animus and broader social-closure strategies. Indeed, American
jurisprudence embraces the concept of "overlapping consensus," in
which groups use liberal democracy to find common ground, with the
goal of achieving justice in a pluralistic society.
121
Consistent with the theory of overlapping consensus, the United
States boasts robust anti-establishment and free exercise jurisprudence.
Notably, anti-establishment principles do provide some of the
foundation for French secularism. In France, as discussed, supra
section 1II, two centuries of occasional bloody strife led to separation of
church and state in 1905, with the conclusion that "the Republic does
not recognize, remunerate or subsidize any faith."' 122 One can debate
the degree to which France embodies this principle, given the
inequality of treatment towards Catholic property and schools as
compared to that of other sects, but the United States agrees with the
ostensible meaning of the language of the law.' 23 Interestingly, the
Establishment Clause, as America's fundamental guideline prohibiting
state religion, provides less explicit limitations than France's 1905 law.
The Establishment Clause simply provides that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion."'2 4 Engle v. Vitale
discusses the pilgrims' abhorrence of the state-mandated "Book of
Common Prayer" in England and the importance of the pilgrim
experience to both the constitutional guarantee against establishment
20 Id. at 5.
121 See generally NORMAN BOWIE & ROBERT SIMON, THE INDIVIDUAL AND
THE POLITICAL ORDER: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 185 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 4th ed. 2008). Bowie
quotes Rawls as saying, "The problem of political liberalism is: How is it
possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and
equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious,
philosophical, and moral doctrines?" Id. at 185 (citing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM (1993)). For a more cynical view of faith-based pluralism, see
Harris, supra note 114, at 26. Harris describes conflicts between religious
groups as "psychological experiments run amok," as though a mad scientist
decided to "give people divergent, irreconcilable, and untestable notions about
what happens after death, and then oblige them to live together with limited
resources." Id.
122 WINTER, supra note 4, at 54.
123 Id. at 54-55.
124 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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and jurisprudence interpreting the Establishment Clause. 12  The
backlash against state-sponsored religion gives the United States
something in common with the French experience.
The hijab debate implicates a Free Exercise analysis more so
than an Establishment Clause analysis, notwithstanding commentators'
identification of a monolithic identity underlying the rejection of
Islamic symbols in France. As to the similarities between the primary
documents at work, the 1905 law states that "the Republic assures
freedom of conscience. It guarantees the free exercise of faiths under
no other restrictions than those set out hereinafter in the interest of
public order."' 26 The principle of the 1905 law harkens back to the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, stating,
"No one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his
religious views, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public
order established by law."' 127 As discussed above, French educators
cast the 2004 law as necessary to the French in the interest of public
order. France's emphasis on "public order" is absent from the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that
"Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise" of
religion.128 Except for the explicit mention of "public order," the
United States and France both have primary documents that protect
religious expression.
A review of American cases illustrates how the Free Exercise
Clause protects the religious prerogative to wear the hyab to a greater
extent than France, notwithstanding the similarities in the founding
documents. United States courts almost certainly would not accept a
blanket ban on the Muslim veil in public school. Hearn v. Muskogee
Public School District is the one federal case brought to challenge the
forced unveiling of a Muslim girl in an Oklahoma high school. 129 The
school capitulated before trial and settled, consenting to a decree
allowing Hearn to re-veil and agreeing to establish a new head covering
policy.130 The new policy allowed a student to request permission to
125 Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-33 (1962).
126 WINTER, supra note 4, at 54.
127 See Dogru, App. No. 27058/05, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1579, available at
http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1579.html (giving brief background
of French secularism).
128 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
129 Hearn v. Muskogee Pub. Sch. Dist. 020, No. CIV 03-598-S (E.D. Okla.
May _, 2004) (consent decree), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/
religdisc/heam consentdecreefinal.pdf.130 id.
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wear a head covering "for a bona fide religious reason.' 13 1 The school
board could deny the permit if it found the student did not have a
sincerely held belief regarding the head covering or if "the exception
would be likely to cause a material danger to safety and security." 132
The Department of Justice (DOJ) submitted a forceful brief for
summary judgment as intervenor-plaintiff in the Hearn case, in which it
argued that Hearn had a valid hybrid free-exercise/free-expression
claim. 133 The DOJ stated that the district supported the ban of the hiab
on several grounds, such as "to further school safety and discipline; to
promote a learning environment free of 'unnecessary' disruption; [and]
to maintain a 'religion-free zone' in schools . . .134
Thus, the school's justifications for making Hearn remove the
hijab resemble the French justifications for the 2004 law.
"Unnecessary disruption" corresponds to the French teachers' calls for
removal of veils to maintain "delicate order." The desire for a
"religion-free zone" aligns with commentators' characterizations of
la~cit as seeking to establish a "protected, privileged, multifunctional
social space within which Republican principles [can] survive and
prosper ' '135 or an "exclusionary" policy towards "public visibility of
religion."'136 However, the school did not actualize these goals in the
Hearn case.
The school in Hearn created a set of bad facts. The school had a
facially general "hat rule" but selectively applied that rule to Hearn
when officials made her remove her headscarf 137 The school allowed
hats in other scenarios to include for the modesty of chemotherapy
patients suffering hair loss. 138 By failing to have a generally applicable
131 Id. at 3.
132 Id.
1" United States' Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, Heam v. Muskogee Pub. Sch. Dist. 020, No. CIV 03-598-S (E.D.
Okla. May 6, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/religdisc/
musk memo.pdf [hereinafter United States Memorandum].
134 Id. at 7 (numbering omitted).
135 BOWEN, supra note 11, at 29.
136 Kuru, supra note 3, at 571.
137 United States Memorandum, supra note 133, at 2.
138 Id. at 3.
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standard, the school's prohibition could not satisfy the required rational
basis review. 139
The DOJ also correctly pointed out that the school had not
established facts showing a substantial threat of disruption, meaning
that the prohibition most likely ran afoul of Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, which confirmed the free
speech prerogative of students. 140 The DOJ compared the hijab to the
black armband in Tinker and referred to the hiab as a "pure
symbol., 141 The political speech of the armband in Tinker and the
religious speech embodied in the hiab both deserve high protection,
but saying the hijab is a pure symbol generalizes too broadly. The
hijab is an article of clothing in addition to being a symbol.
The DOJ also argued for strict scrutiny on the basis of the hybrid
character of Heam's claim in that it touched both her rights to free
speech and religious liberty. 142 The District Court did not rule on the
merits in Hearn, but the hybrid claim seems appropriate in the hijab
context. The hybrid rights concept has appeared in school First
Amendment jurisprudence elsewhere. It applied in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters to the extent that the combined powers of the Free Exercise
Clause and parental autonomy over a child's education prevent the state
from prohibiting the maintenance of private schools. 143  A similar
argument arose in Wisconsin v. Yoder, a case in which Amish parents
benefited from the hybrid right to exercise religion freely and to control
the upbringing of their children. 144 Granted, neither Pierce nor Yoder
used the word "hybrid," but the Supreme Court later recognized the
rights as such. 145 The concept of hybrid rights fits squarely into the
hiab debate and reflects an ideology crucial to American jurisprudence
but absent from French thought.
As further support of the ideological rift illustrated by the hijab
in Passive and Aggressive Secularism: Historical Conditions,
Ideological Struggles, and State Policies toward Religion, Ahmett
Kuru argues that differences in the ideologies of officials account for
139 Id. at 11 (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-79
(1990)).
140 Id. at 21 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508 (1969)).
141 Id.
142 Id. at 14.
143 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
144 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
141 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
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the differences in the respective approaches to secularism in the United
States and France. 46 He points out that even Supreme Court Justices
have believed in either "accommodation" or "separation" to varying
degrees. 147 As he points out, "separationists" have kept prayer out of
school, yet "accommodationists" ultimately prevailed because religious
clubs may meet in school classrooms after school hours.' The case to
which Kuru refers, Good News Club v. Milford Central School, strikes
an interesting contrast with the French experience. 49 In that case, the
Supreme Court held that excluding a religious student group from
meeting in a public school classroom after school hours violated the
free speech rights of the students and that allowing such meetings
would not create an establishment clause problem. 150 In France, the
presence of conspicuously religious symbols on the part of students
violates the secular nature of the public space. 15 ' The presence of an
after-school religious group implicates establishment at least to the
extent that the wearing of the hijab does; consistency would require a
case like Good News to come out the other way in France.
On the other hand, France's continued direct support of Catholic
schools reveals a paradox. The same kind of long-lasting, direct
funding in the United States would probably run afoul of our school
funding cases, notwithstanding the approval of Ohio's distinguishable
scheme in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. 52 In France, the government
funds Catholic school unilaterally while in Zelman the parents, as
private decision-makers, diverted the funds to the schools. The
comparison of United States religious school funding and French
146 Kuru, supra note 3.
147 Id. at 580.
las Id.
149 Good News Club v. Milford, 553 U.S. 98 (2001).
15o Id.
151 French courts arguably perceive entanglement or even establishment
by virtue of a religious symbol's mere presence in a public space. Perhaps the
difference from the view of American courts is a matter of degree. Free
exercise and establishment are two sides of the same coin, after all. As stated
in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 256 (1963), "the
Establishment Clause [is] a coguarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of
religious liberty. The framers did not entrust the liberty of religious beliefs to
either clause alone." If the difference is one of degree, France must either
equate the private expression with establishment of a religion or believe that
subjecting others to the private expression violates their free exercise
prerogatives.
152 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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religious school funding does not directly bear on the hijab debate, but
it reflects a noteworthy inconsistency in the French approach. The
French allow direct funding, which the United States does not, but the
French do not allow individual expression of religious belief, which the
United States does allow.
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet also has
implications for the hyab debate, at least from the perspective of
overlapping consensus.' 53 In that case, the Supreme Court rejected a
scheme that insulated students of a particular religion in their own
school district. 154 Special needs children from the Satmar Hasidic
community had to attend special programs at public schools because of
the community's lack of such programs but experienced "panic, fear
and trauma" in the public schools on account of "leaving their own
community and being with people whose ways were so different."' 55
In response, New York created a public district for the Satmar
community. 56 Similarly, Muslim girls might experience feelings of
trauma in public schools (in France or the U.S.), either because of the
veil's differentiating effect or because of forced un-veiling. With both
the veil debate and the case of the Satmars, the state arbitrates between
society at large and an insular group.
Kiryas Joel represented the attempt of a state to allow a
community to exist insulated from the rest of American society. One
could view its holding as adopting a positive principle rejecting such
insulation. Calls for more Muslim schools in France, which may be
justified given the ubiquity of Catholic schools, could result in the same
insulating effect. If Catholic, Jewish, or atheist children would not
attend Muslim schools, which seems likely, the potential homogeneity
of widespread Muslim schools could magnify the insulating effect.
The United States Supreme Court ultimately held that the
specially-created school district for the Satmars amounted to "an
allocation of political power on a religious criterion and neither
presupposes nor requires governmental impartiality toward religion"
and therefore violated the Establishment Clause. 57  Admittedly,
establishment and entanglement are not the predominate issues in the
hijab debate, even if as in Hearn, schools require special permission for
153 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687
(1994).
154 Id.
' Id. at 692.
116 Id. at 693.
' Id. at 690.
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a Muslim girl to wear the hijab in the face of an otherwise generally
applicable ban on hats, which might come close to entanglement.
58
Special permission to veil does not amount to "a government's
purposeful delegation on the basis of religion," as with the school
district in Kiryas Joel.159 Kiryas Joel does not provide a perfect
analogue to the hijab debate but does give context to its integration and
overlapping consensus implications.
Chalifoux v. New Caney Independent School District bolsters the
likelihood that a United States court would reject a broad prohibition of
the hyab.160 The school in Chalifoux cited gang affiliation as grounds
for prohibiting rosaries.16 1 The court held that the rosaries were "pure
speech" and thus did not fall within United States v. O'Brien, which
allows the state to regulate conduct if the conduct has only incidental
implications for expression.1 62 Nor did the prohibition of rosaries fall
exactly within Tinker because the school did not intend to "restrict
Plaintiffs' religious message."'' 63 Nevertheless, the court chose to use
Tinker's substantial disruption standard) 64 The court found that the
school had not presented sufficient evidence to show disruption or
threat of disruption resulting from the rosaries.165 The plaintiffs had no
gang ties, and the school told them to remove the rosaries largely to
protect the plaintiffs themselves. 66 The school did have evidence of
some gang members wearing rosaries for affiliation in and out of
school, but the court saw the incidents as too speculative and
insufficient to show a threat of disruption.
167
The threat of disruption from potential gang affiliation in
Chalifoux probably surpasses any threat of disruption stemming from
the hiab. The school in Hearn did cite concerns about gang activity
and the disruptive aspect of some student complaints, but it did not
seem to have any evidence to support the gang argument, and mere
158 I am referring to the terms of the settlement in Hearn, not the initial
order to Hearn to unveil.
159 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 699.
160 Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F.Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex.
1997).
161 Id. at 663.
162 Id. at 666 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
163 Id.
164id.
165 Id. at 667.
166 Chalifoux, 976 F.Supp. at 663.
161 Id. at 667.
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student complaints almost certainly would not have carried the day.
The amount of evidence necessary to show disruption, given
Chalifoux's disregard for the evidence of gang activity, overshadows
the claim by French school administrators that protecting the "delicate"
balance of order required prohibiting the veil. Of course, the French
administrators' claim referred to a national prohibition to protect a
national balance, but national disorder in the United States could hardly
constitute reliable evidence of a threat of disruption in any individual
school. 168 And more generally, the potential for hybrid claims, 69 would
probably outweigh claims of disruption in all but the most extreme
circumstances in the United States.
Cases outside the school context have also dealt with religious
head coverings. These cases, while dealing with adults, help define the
parameters of the hijab's potential protection and deserve at least a
brief examination. The Third Circuit upheld the prohibition on the
hijab for a Philadelphia police officer in Webb v. City of Philadelphia,
citing the importance of "a disciplined rank and file for efficient
conduct of [police department] affairs."' 170 The need for discipline in
the police setting can therefore overcome the free exercise prerogative
of the officer. The need for identification in jails, courts, and other
government institutions similarly overcomes the prerogatives of
visitors.
In Ishmawiyl v. Vaughn,17 1 a district court denied a preliminary
injunction sought by a Muslim woman who had to wait until a female
prison worker became available to watch her remove her veil before
she could enter for visitation with her incarcerated son. The court
found that the state had a compelling interest in identifying visitors by
face and that the practice of using a female officer when available was
168 Bowen points out that French teachers were divided on the ban, but
administrators supported it in hopes of a "definitive solution." BOWEN, supra
note 11, at 121.
169 While different circuits treat hybrid claims differently, a more detailed
examination is beyond the scope of this paper. Overall, hybrid claim
arguments would still benefit a hijab wearer.
170 Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 2009). The same
court previously held that the department must allow religious beards for
Muslim officers because of the exception offered to officers who could not
shave for medical reasons. See Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12
v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d. Cir. 1999).
171lshmawiyl v. Vaughn, No.94-7040, 1995 WL 461949, (E.D.Pa. Aug. 1,
1995).
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narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Using a similar approach,
the Attorney General of Maryland opined that in conducting courthouse
security, "it would be useful if security details were comprised of both
male and female officers and if a private space were available at the
entrance of the courthouse for those individuals whose religion
discourages removal of a head covering in public. 173
A Florida court found no substantial burdening of a Muslim
woman's sincerely held religious beliefs when the state denied her a
driver's license because of her refusal to unveil for the picture.174 The
court relied heavily on an expert Muslim witness for the state who
"testified that Islamic law accommodates exceptions to the practice of
veiling because of 'necessity.' 17 5 The expert also pointed out that
"even in Saudi Arabia, women are required to have fullface
photographs for their passports and for exam taking.'
176
Returning to the public school setting, at least three states have
laws prohibiting teachers from wearing religious garb. Oregon's law
says that "[n]o teacher in any public school shall wear any religious
dress while engaged in the performance of duties as a teacher."'
177
Pennsylvania's law says "[t]hat no teacher in any public school shall
wear in said school or while engaged in the performance of his duty as
such teacher any dress, mark, emblem or insignia indicating the fact
that such teacher is a member or adherent of any religious order, sect or
denomination.' 78 Finally, Nebraska makes it illegal for a teacher to
wear "in such school or while engaged in the performance of his or her
duty, any dress or garb indicating the fact that such teacher is a member
or an adherent of any religious order, sect, or denomination."17 9 These
statutes have survived constitutional attack. For example, in 1990, the
Third Circuit upheld the Pennsylvania law on the grounds that the state
has a compelling interest in maintaining a teacher's appearance of
religious neutrality and that Pennsylvania narrowly tailored the law to
172 id.
171 94 Md. Op. Atty. Gen. 81 (2009).
174 Freeman v. Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 924 So.2d 48
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
171 Id. at 52.
176 Id.
177 OR. REv. STAT. § 342.650 (2009).
178 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11-1112 (2009).
179 NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-898 (2009).
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meet that interest.' 80 The validity of these laws, as compared to a
hypothetical (and invalid) ban on the hijab for students, delineates one
distinction between a religious-garb establishment issue and a
religious-garb free expression issue for American courts.
The American cases discussed illustrate the tolerance inherent in
a theory of justice in which liberal democracy seeks overlapping
consensus. Even in the case of forced integration, like Kiryas Joel,
groups must find common ground to avoid constant friction. At least,
American jurisprudence suggests this is the case.
VIII. INTEGRATION IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES
The United States jurisprudence shows a higher institutional
tolerance for religious expression in schools than that of France. I posit
that the American approach has the potential to facilitate social
integration to a greater degree than the French approach. The last
section of this paper discusses integration trends in the United States
and France with an emphasis on public school.
Trica Keaton integrated herself into a Muslim banlieue to survey
school age Muslim girls in search of information about French
assimilationism. In her article on the experience, she says that
"...arrogant assimilationism, buttressed by a common culture ideology,
inheres in French society" and is an "expectation" within the
banlieues.181  Keaton unsurprisingly finds that France's militant
approach to assimilation "is not only reflected in national identity
politics but also meditated by educational structures."' 8 2 "[T]he school,
as an extension of the state, is a primary site for the imposition and
elaboration of the dominant culture and its categories of perception,"
says Keaton. 183 Public school becomes like a fulcrum, the point of
convergence of immigrant cultures and the monolith of the state.
Banning headscarves thus drives a wedge between immigrant
communities and the rest of France. Keaton describes the "other
France," consisting of Muslim banlieues filled with individuals that,
180 United States v. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d 882 (3d
Cir. 1990).
181 Trica Keaton, Arrogant Assimilationism: National Identity Politics and
African-Origin Muslim Girls in the Other France, 36 ANTHROPOLOGY & ED. Q.
405, 406 (2005).
182 Id.
183 Id. at 407 (citing PIERRE BOuRDIEU & Loic WACQUANT, AN INVITATION
To REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY (1992)).
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despite their self-identification as natives of France, are "les autres" in
the eyes of France.1 84 To summarize the plight of the immigrant youth
in France, "[a]s youth from the other France, they have been constituted
as delinquents-an identified social problem. As youth of color, they
are racialized, and as Muslim girls, they are viewed as the antithesis of
French national identity." 185 Adding to the identity crisis is the fact that
youth who return to their countries of origin may face stigmatization
for having "defected" to French culture.1 86 Females in particular may
face the challenge of having people "back home" assume they lost their
sexual virginity in the "sexually liberal France. 187
Keaton is not alone in her analysis. The literature is replete with
stories of alienation of Muslims in France and its neighboring states.
88
Hostile generalizations grouping violence with Islam have become
increasingly commonplace throughout Europe and the United States.
One educator describes the nature of the slurs she heard in high schools
with an example from a 16-year-old American student: "If they are not
terrorists themselves, they are probably related to one!"
189
Public school can play a powerful role in addressing this cultural
dissonance, setting the stage for peaceful coexistence consistent with
the principle of overlapping consensus. Public school, as uniformly
available and pedagogical in nature can "prepare children for our
pluralistic society." 190 Indeed, one author points out that "not only do
young people experience the greatest part of their social learning within
the new society and through its institutions, but they also represent the
future of the family and the ethnic or religious community in the
184 Id. at 406. "Les autres" means "the others," and encompasses
"outsiders" or "non-French" in this context.
185 Keaton, supra note 181, at 406.
186 Id. at 410.
187 Id.
188 For example, in his introduction to CONFRONTING ISLAMOPHOBIA IN
EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE, Van Driel describes a poster promulgated by the
Dutch government depicting a woman in a hijab with the caption, "how can we
liberate them?" Barry van Driel, Introduction to CONFRONTING ISLAMOPHOBIA
IN EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE, at ix (Barry van Driel ed.,Trentham Books, 2004).
189 J'Lein Liese, The Subtleties of Prejudice: How Schools Unwittingly
Facilitate Islamophobia and How to Remedy This, in CONFRONTING
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE 66 (Barry van Driel ed., 2004).
190 Beth Finkelstein, Practical Educational Programming that Confronts
Islamophobia, in CONFRONTING ISLAMOPHOBIA IN EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE 77
(Barry van Driel ed., 2004).
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country of residence."''9 A proponent of a religious education
curriculum explains the importance of instilling proper skills in a
multicultural society at a young age:
To thrive in a diverse society and to be prepared to
combat prejudice, one needs to be able to understand
one's own identity, ask important and respectful
questions about others, and find enrichment, not
threat, in diversity. These are basic, social-emotional
skills, which can be built into the classroom setting.
The time to begin teaching these civic, social-
emotional skills and to prepare children to learn
about the religions of the world is at the very start of
formal education, for both developmental and
academic reasons. Prejudice and bias do not afflict
only adolescents and adults. Research indicates that
children can exhibit racist attitudes as early as
preschool. Even toddlers can form negative
prejudices in an environment that displays 'clear
ethnic friction." 
92
The public school, as a dominant influence in a child's formative
years, can play a part in preempting future racism in an increasingly
connected, pluralistic America. In that sense, public school "must
prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic .... It must inculcate the
habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to
happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the
community and the nation."'
193
Among the potential benefits to using public school as a vehicle
to facilitate assimilation is the opportunity to prevent social backlash of
Muslim families in America. Keaton reports that some 60,000 Muslim
students have left schools in France in the last ten years "without any
meaningful certifications or diplomas, only to join the ranks of the
191 Patricia Kelly Spurles, Coding Dress: Gender and the Articulation of
Identity in a Canadian Muslim School, in THE MUSLIM VEIL IN NORTH
AMERICA: ISSUES AND DEBATES 46 (Sajida Sultana Alvi et al. eds., Women's
Press, 2003).
192 Finkelstien, supra note 190, at 82 (internal citations omitted).
193 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting
C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228
(1968)).
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unemployed."' 194  Alienation of racial groups mirrors alienation of
individuals within those groups. "People who feel under attack retreat
further into their own communities, which is exactly what we do not
want to happen," argues a columnist in the Irish Times.195  The
downslide into an insulated subgroup can lead not only to economic
failure but also to alignment with extreme groups. Individual identity
crisis and the solace of extreme social groups can have synergistic
momentum during the formative years of an immigrant searching for
identity. 196
Why should the veil play such a crucial role in the integration of
immigrants or the continued well-being of more established families in
France or the United States? Rejection of the veil alone does not lead
to immediate alignments with terrorist organizations. However,
assuming the veil plays an unimportant or innocuous role in Muslim
culture improperly minimizes a profoundly complex article of clothing.
Evidence shows French Muslims with the means to do so flocked to
private Catholic schools as tension surrounding the headscarf debate
rose because the Catholic schools allowed girls to wear headscarves.
197
To put the potential gravity of the reaction of some Muslims in
perspective, "[f]orced unveiling of women in Iran is comparable to the
shock that Westerners would experience if women of all ages were
forced to go topless in public."'' 98 Not every Muslim's reaction would
194 Keaton, supra note 181, at 406.
195 Breda O'Brien, Editorial, It Is Better to Avoid Making the Hyab a
Major Issue, THE IRISH TIMES, May 31, 2008, at 14.
196 For one story of such a downslide into terrorism, see Sara Wajid,
Extremism and Back, TIMES EDUCATIONAL SUPPLEMENT, Nov. 16, 2007, at 8.
The following is excerpted from Wajid's interview with a Bangladeshi former
terrorist in England: "'I've never identified myself as Bangladeshi - I was born
here, raised here and didn't visit Bangladesh till [sic] I was 19 and that was only
to see my grandparents,' he says. In his isolation, he turned to religion, and
befriended another pupil who led him towards extremism." Id. at 7. In the case
of the interviewee, "[b]y 16, he says he had no white friends at all and had to
make a choice between Asian street gangs and well-dressed Islamists. He
chose the Islamists." Id. In his words, "'Hizb ut-Tahrir gave me that social
network and sense of belonging that Britain didn't - and still doesn't - offer the
young children of immigrants. What are we supposed to sign up for? Identity
is a huge problem."' Id.
197 Judge, supra note 24, at 15.
198 EL GUINDI, supra note 7, at 130 (quoting J. Norton, Faith and Fashion
in Turkey, in LANGUAGES OF DRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 149-77 (N.
Lindisfame-Tapper et al. eds., Curzon with The Centre of Near and Middle
Eastern Studies, SOAS, 1997)).
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be this grave, but it is a potential reaction nonetheless.
Muslim women in the United States often adopt the veil during a
unilateral search for identity having nothing to do with suppressive
influence of men. One researcher conducted numerous interviews with
Muslim girls growing up in Muslim families that had recently relocated
to Canada from other countries. 199 The interviews reveal identity issues
as the girls try to cope with conflicting spheres of reality influencing
their lives, particularly at the middle school and high school ages when
other girls start dating, going out, and generally exploring social life as
young adults.200 The researcher reports, perhaps curiously, that the
young Muslim immigrants increasingly attend mosque and increasingly
seek "discussion groups, youth camps, and Internet sites where women
can participate in discussion and debate, particularly younger
women." 20 1 Also particularly important for immigrant Muslim females
is that symbols such as the veil give meaning to the social solidarity of
cultural groups. As one anthropologist puts it, "dress survives
destabilized geography and borders to communicate messages about
identity and to serve as an embodiment of a group's memory."
20 2
The trends revealed in the research tend to show that Muslim
girls in Muslim families in Canada adopt the veil for various reasons.
While the influence of restrictive parents comes into play for many
girls, the author does not describe involuntary veiling for any of the
199 Homa Hoodfar, More Than Clothing: Veiling as an Adaptive Strategy,
in THE MUSLIM VEIL IN NORTH AMERICA: ISSUES AND DEBATES 3-40 (Sajida
Sultana Alvi et al. eds., Women's Press, 2003).
200 Id. A recurring theme throughout the study is that many girls adopt the
veil unilaterally (without any demand from the family), sometimes
accompanied by unilateral study of Islam. Id. at 23-24. The girls seemed to
value the respect earned from their families resulting from the embracement of
Islam and the cultural traditions of "home." Id. One young woman even says,
"I would never have taken up the veil if I lived in Egypt. Id. at 30. The
motivation for her to veil derived from a desire to identify with Islamic values
and assert that identity while surrounded by Western society. Id. at 31. Often
the girls in the study chose to veil for the sole purpose of getting more freedom
in an otherwise strict household. Id. at 18. The parents believe the girls are
growing up as "good" Muslim girls, as evidenced by the veil, and become more
likely to give the girls freedom to do the things less-restricted (non-Muslim)
young adults do. Id. The girls get a better chance to succeed at socialization.
Id. The same researcher mentions the tendency of career Muslim women in
North America who completely "Westernize" to return to Islam and re-adopt
Islamic values, often seeking Muslim males as marriage partners. Id. at 34-37.
201 Id. at 17.
202 EL GUINDI, supra note 7, at 58.
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girls. The interviews illuminate struggles to integrate into Canadian
society. The prevalence of identity issues among young Canadian
Muslim females likely applies equally to Muslim females in the United
States. Mancini referred to human identity as necessarily plural.2 °3 Her
truism applies with full force in the context of veiling in public schools.
IX. CONCLUSION
"Not taking into account 'their inescapably plural identities'
ends up trapping human beings within monolithical, non-negotiable
identities, anchored to their history and unsusceptible of
transformation, and therefore structurally meant to clash, rather than to
dialogue, with 'other' identities." 2°4  Public school, an institution
specially situated at the intersection of the nuclear family and the state,
has the potential to enable integration unlike any other public
institution in modem society. The average American spends the bulk
of her formative years in a public school classroom, bringing home a
multitude of experiences, good and bad, enlightening and disabling,
offered by its teachers and students.
Additionally, a culturally insulated family may have its closest
contact with the larger American culture by way of the child's
attendance at public school. Whether the child is met with curiosity,
disdain, hostility, or acceptance can shape the entire family's
integration experience. Institutional reactions, bearing the imprimatur
of the state and therefore of the people, can assault or assuage the
sensibilities of the "other" depending on the content of those reactions.
This is true of state institutional reactions even more profoundly than it
is of the collective reactions of individuals in the state. Acceptance of
the veil is not a panacea for integration struggles. However, American
constitutional guarantees may offer capable tools for arbitrating the
struggle of groups and individuals to find commonalities in a shrinking,
plural, and complex world.
203 Mancini, supra note 90, at 2667.
204 id.
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